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PAPER 4: 
THE POLITICS OF FEAR: RELIGION(S), 
CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY  
 
Paul Weller 
Emeritus Professor, University of Derby and Research 
Fellow in Religion and Society, Regent's Park College, 
University of Oxford   
 
Introduction 
As historical phenomena, religions (as 
well as ideologies) have played varied 
and often ambiguous roles in the 
context of international relations, violent 
conflicts, peace-making and diplomacy 
(Ferguson, 1977; Haynes, 1988), and 
especially so at the interface between 
civilisations informed by Christianity 
and those informed by Islam 
(Armstrong, 1988; Partner, 1997). This 
paper focuses on aspects of those roles 
as the context for these has changed 
over the past half a century within the 
context of a broader setting shaped by 
what has come to be known as the 
“politics of fear” (Furedi, 2006), 
originally shaped by the threat of 
nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction  
 
 
 
 
and now by the threat of global terror 
attacks.  
 
In the earlier part of the 20th century, 
state parties had constituted the 
principal arenas for, and provided the 
key actors in, diplomacy as classically 
understood. But at the same time, and 
especially in the light of the 
development of international human 
rights law and mechanisms that 
followed the end of the Second World 
War, non-state actors from civil society 
groups, movements and organisations 
(including also those of a religious 
character or having a religious 
inspiration) came to play an 
increasingly important role alongside 
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the classical forms of diplomacy 
undertaken by state representatives.  
 
This occurred in parallel with the 
emergence of new challenges that 
faced traditional inter-state diplomacy 
and that came to the fore with the 
development of armed liberation 
movements to achieve national 
independence in the context of an 
overall decolonization process, the 
legitimacy of which had broad 
international recognition. In these 
developments, matters of “internal” 
conflict increasingly came into 
interaction with external relations as 
can variously be seen in the examples 
of the African National Congress’ 
(ANC) struggle against the apartheid 
state of the Republic of South Africa; 
the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) and Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union’s (ZAPU) struggle 
against the illegal 1965 unilateral 
declaration of independence of the 
former Southern Rhodesia colonial 
government; the South-West African 
People’s Organisation’s (SWAPO) 
struggle against the colonial inheritance 
and South African rule of South-West 
Africa; and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation’s (PLO) struggle against 
Israeli occupation.  
 
In these instances the movements 
either themselves achieved some 
degree of international recognition 
and/or international collective action in 
relation to at least the root causes of 
their struggles that involved violent 
action, often characterised by others as 
being “terrorist” in nature. Thus, in 
1962, the United Nations 
Organisation’s (UNO) General 
Assembly called for sanctions against 
the Republic of South Africa and 
established a Special Committee 
Against Apartheid (Reddy, 2012); in 
1966, UNO Security Council sanctions 
were invoked against Rhodesia and in 
1972 SWAPO was recognized by the 
UNO General Assembly as the “sole 
legitimate representative” of the 
Namibia’s people (Nyangongi, 1985); 
and the PLO was recognized by the 
UNO General Assembly as 
“representative of the Palestinian 
people”, and the status of a UNO “non-
member observer entity” (Gresh, 1988).  
 
In the same period, revolutionary 
guerilla movements in South and 
Central America posed even further 
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questions and challenges to classical 
inter-state diplomatic practice such as 
Fidel Castro’s 26th July Movement, 
which eventually came to power in 
Cuba 1959; and in Nicaragua, where 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
formed part of a Junta of National 
Reconstruction in 1979, and then 
consolidated power on its own from 
1981 onwards; while in El Salvador the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front was locked in an ongoing war with 
the military and government of the 
country. In contrast to the case of the 
African liberation movements, the 
struggles of these movements did not 
take place within the more broadly 
recognized framework of direct and 
formal decolonization. However, in the 
case of El Salvador, the UNO became 
involved in peace negotiations in 1990 
and, on January 16, 1992, the 
Chapultepec Peace Agreement was 
signed in Mexico City, formally ending 
the conflict. 
 
Both the African liberation movements 
and the revolutionary movements of 
                                                        
5  Albeit this should more properly be 
described as “really existing socialism”, since 
Communism  was the ideal to which those 
states aspired while building their 
understanding of socialism. 
Central and Latin America, of course, 
emerged within the broader context of 
the so-called “Cold War” conducted 
between the international social, 
political, economic and military forces 
of what was popularly called 
“Communism” 5  and those of 
“Capitalism”. The former were aligned 
particularly with the USSR (Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics) and its allies 
or with the People’s Republic of China, 
while the latter were aligned with the 
United States of America (USA) and its 
allies. To a large extent, this broader 
alignment of forces shaped the 
parameters of the individual violent 
conflicts even where these had origins 
that were primarily internal – although 
the role of the so-called Non-Aligned 
Movement6 in this period should also 
not be overlooked (Köchler, 1988).  
 
During the Cold War, and given its roots 
in Europe, in relation to the Christian 
Churches in particular there were, on 
the one hand, attempts from within the 
capitalist world to enlist believers into 
what was a broad anti-Communist 
6  Which was the more commonly used 
name for the formally called Conference of 
Heads of State or  Government of Non-
Aligned Countries founded in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia, in 1961. 
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(Milliband, Saville and Liebmann, 1984) 
front. This was on the basis of such 
figures as the US Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, arguing that the 
states of “really existing socialism” were 
expressions of “godless terrorism” or, 
as it was more generally expressed, as 
part of the forces of atheistic 
materialism ranged against what was 
often called “Christian civilisation”, 
involving the destruction of 
Christendom culture, the appropriation 
of Church property, and at least 
restrictions on religious freedom if not in 
at least some settings and periods, the 
outright persecution of them. Thus 
Dulles, who also played a significant 
role in the World Council of Churches’ 
(WCC), Churches Commission on 
International Affairs (Hudson, 1969) 
tried, albeit without success, at its 1948 
Amsterdam Assembly to enlist the (at 
that point largely Protestant) WCC into 
a Christian anti-Communism (Kuem, 
2016: 120).  
 
At the same time, there were also 
Christians and Marxists who had 
shared experiences in the resistance 
against Nazism (see Kreck, 1988). And 
there were also theologians such as 
Josef Hromádka (see Salajka, 1985; 
Opočenský, 1990) of the Church of 
Czech Brethren who refused to accept 
co-option into the anti-Communist 
discourse which figures such as Dulles 
sought to promote, arguing instead that 
believers living in both socialist and 
capitalist societies faced challenges to 
their Christian faithfulness and integrity. 
Indeed, it was following an intervention 
from Hromádka at the WCC 
Amsterdam Assembly, and which 
offered a biblically-informed critique of 
capitalist society, that the Assembly 
declined to take up an anti-Communist 
position, choosing instead to articulate 
a Christian vision of a “responsible 
society” as being of relevance to a state 
with any social system. 
 
At the same time, among Communists 
and other supporters of “really existing 
socialism”, while there were some such 
as the Czech political philosopher, 
Milan Machovec (1976) who were 
ready to engage in Marxist-Christian 
dialogue, there were others who saw 
the Christian Churches as being 
aligned with the inheritance of ruling 
powers from the old aristocratic, 
monarchical and/or bourgeois capitalist 
social orders. Indeed, many of the 
leaders of the states of “really existing 
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socialism” feared that organized 
religions could potentially act as 
destabilizing fifth-columnists, and this 
was especially so in relation to the 
Roman Catholic Church, given its 
international structure and its 
relationship with the Vatican state (see 
Luxmoore and Babiuch, 1999).   
 
But despite these challenges coming 
from both sides of the Cold War divide, 
and notwithstanding the internal 
contradictions within the Christian 
community, even the fact of the 
existence of ecclesial bodies in the 
same Christian tradition, but on 
different sides of the Iron Curtain 
(Chadwick, 1993), and of related supra-
national organisational networks such 
as the European Baptist Federation 
(Green, 1999), helped to facilitate a 
sense of wider Christian and also 
European community. And in the 
context of what was an otherwise quite 
sharply divided continent where many 
of the supra-national forms of 
professional associations, trade unions 
and similar bodies were organised on a 
basis that reflected the political, 
economic and military lines of 
difference, supra-national ecumenical 
bodies such the World Council of 
Churches, the Conference of European 
Churches and the Prague-based 
Christian Peace Conference (Wirth, 
1988) had Protestant and Orthodox 
Church memberships that straddled the 
political and military blocs. Although 
this community thereby reflected and 
sustained was inevitably limited and 
constrained, it was something not 
entirely determined by the political, 
economic and military divisions of the 
continent. At the very least, it enabled 
communications across the blocs and 
in many ways contributed to the 
building of bridges and channels for 
wider diplomatic and societal 
confidence-building.  
 
In addition, the facilitation of the 
possibility of mutual challenge also 
became possible, not least because the 
Churches and ecumenical bodies had 
contributed to the non-state initiatives 
that helped to lay the groundwork for 
the development and implementation of 
the stabilising framework for 
international relations that eventually 
became known as the Helsinki Final Act 
(Auswätiges Amt, 1984) of 1975, within 
which the states parties concerned also 
signed up to a common commitment 
towards, and framework for, dealing 
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with matters of human rights, within 
which the Governments, civil society 
organisations and Churches were able 
to raise and pursue specific issues and 
cases of human rights. Although 
criticised by some for reifying overall 
spheres of influence and thus for de 
jure as well as de facto recognition of 
“Communist” rule in the countries of the 
East and Central Europe, by 
recognising state borders (a number of 
which had, for some countries, 
remained in question since the Second 
World War) Helsinki helped to facilitate 
a more stable environment for the 
further development of East-West 
diplomacy that, in due course, reduced 
the threat of nuclear escalation and 
Mutually Assured Destruction.  
 
At the same time, this stabilization did 
not address other important (often 
internal) conflicts in Europe and in other 
parts of the world in relation to which, 
however, international level religious 
and religiously-inspired groups were 
often active, either within traditional 
diplomacy, alongside it, or as an 
alternative to it. Just as the existence of 
the Christian Churches on either side of 
the Iron Curtain created an opening for 
wider European diplomacy, so also in 
global terms, religious communities, 
groups and their international networks 
and organisations stand at the 
intersection between the global and the 
local in a world that is both increasingly 
globalising and localising. They are 
simultaneously part of transnational 
communities of (often alternative) 
information and solidarity, while being 
rooted firmly within their wider local 
communities and civic societies of the 
state of which they are citizens. Among 
other things, the channels of 
communication that they open up 
between co-religionists in rich and 
powerful and poor and relatively 
powerless countries help those in the 
relatively rich and powerful countries to 
come to some understanding of why it 
is that, in the title of the book by Meic 
Pearse (2003), Why The Rest Hates 
the West. 
 
In the earlier part of the period under 
review, the World Council of Churches 
offered such through its radical 
Programme to Combat Racism, which 
provided channels of information, 
communication and practical support 
relating to African liberation movements 
(Adler, 1974), as did also the 
development of the movement known 
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as liberation theology (Bonino, 1976). 
Also on an international level, but 
operating on a multi- and inter-religious 
basis, has been the activities of the 
organisations that is now called 
Religions for Peace, but which was 
originally known as the World 
Conference of Religions for Peace 
(WCRP) (see Jack, 1993), a body that 
has consultative status in the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), as well as with UNESCO 
and UNICEF.  
 
As reflected in its name, Religions for 
Peace focuses on the contribution that 
religions can make to establishing, 
preserving and developing peace in the 
world, including through interreligious 
dialogue aimed at overcoming conflicts 
that are rooted in religious differences. 
Following its first meeting in Kyoto in 
1970, it agreed to forward the impetus 
of its initiating conference through four 
key programmes that, since then, have 
continued to form the broad parameters 
for its work. This included: to create a 
climate for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes among and within nations 
without violence by initiating 
interreligious seminars and 
conferences at all levels; to develop an 
interreligious presence at the United 
Nations and other international 
agencies and events, through which the 
influence of religion could be directly 
exerted to resolve conflicts; to 
encourage the further development of 
the science of interreligious dialogue for 
peace; and to encourage the 
establishment of national and regional 
committees for peace.  
 
Today Religions for Peace holds a 
global Assembly every five years and 
has an extensive network of national 
affiliates and a number of regional 
bodies. A European Committee of the 
WCRP (now known as Religions for 
Peace, Europe) and a UK and Ireland 
Chapter (later separating out into a 
distinct UK Chapter and an Irish 
Chapter and today known as Religions 
for Peace, UK) were formed in 1975. 
Significantly, some of its most active, 
creative and productive work in relation 
to violent conflict has been precisely in 
relation to those “internal” contexts with 
implications for wider regions that 
traditional, state representative based 
diplomacy has found it most difficult to 
make progress. Thus, for example, 
Religions for Peace was very active in 
working towards the peace settlement 
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in Sierra Leone’s brutal civil and 
regional war, and undertook notable 
initiatives in the context of the Balkan wars 
(Merdjanova and Brodeur, 2009). 
 
As earlier noted, in the Two Thirds 
World, some of these “internal” conflicts 
became full scale wars, while within 
Europe others remained more of the 
nature of what the UK Army Brigadier 
Frank Kitson (1971) characterized as 
“low intensity” wars. One such example 
was the period of political violence 
known in the north of Ireland as “The 
Troubles” (Kelly, 1982) where, of 
course, religion itself was implicated 
due to sectarian communalisms 
espousing Christian traditions being 
woven into what is, however, more 
fundamentally a conflict between 
divergent national identities (Liechty 
and Clegg, eds., 2001). In this, Catholic 
and nationalist aspirations have been 
broadly aligned, while many northern 
Protestants tended towards unionism 
and some towards types of Loyalism 
that were informed by a strong anti-
Catholicism. At the same time, as in the 
setting of the wider Cold War, in this 
context of this “hot” but “low intensity” 
war, the continuation of all-Irish 
ecclesial structures across the political 
borders of Ireland’s partition into the 
Irish Free State (and later the Republic 
of Ireland) and the UK province of 
Northern Ireland, also contributed to 
facilitating the back channels that 
eventually led to the Good Friday 
Peace agreement.  
 
The majority of these “low intensity” 
wars, both in Europe and beyond, also 
entailed the use of terror (Guelke, 2006; 
Hoffman, 2006) tactics by one or more 
parties to the conflict that, for example, 
included the bombing of civilian 
infrastructure and of civilians. 
Especially among Palestinian armed 
groups the tools of hijack, kidnap and 
ransom, were common. In the 
Lebanon, following what had previously 
been a full scale civil war accompanied 
by the intervention of external powers, 
kidnap and ransom was frequently 
deployed by the various militias. In this 
context one of the most well-known of 
religiously based diplomatic 
interventions tool place via the work of 
Terry Waite (1993). Waite was 
originally the Anglican Archbishop of 
Canterbury’s emissary to the Middle 
East who, after successfully working to 
free a number of hostages, himself 
eventually became a victim of kidnap 
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and was held as a hostage for several 
years. In illustration of just how complex 
and challenging for the religions and 
religious people themselves such 
religiously-based interventions can be 
and become, following his release 
Waite later found himself caught up in 
allegations of complicity, or at least of 
maintaining insufficient distance, from 
US interlocutors in relation to the role in 
the Middle East of Colonel Oliver North 
and the so-called Iran-Contra scandal. 
Similarly, the Christian Peace 
Conference had earlier found its 
religiously-based activities on behalf of 
peace and justice (Bassarak, 1972) 
being identified by the US Department 
of State (1985) as an example of 
“Soviet active measures”. 
 
At the start of the 21st century, although 
there have been exceptions, the vast 
majority of terror actions have been 
associated with individuals and groups 
who have sought to justify their actions 
with reference to the religion of Islam. 
As the veteran British socialist 
politician, Tony Benn, put it at the start 
of the The Satanic Verses controversy 
which highlighted that, following the 
end of the Cold War an important 
paradigm-shift for international conflict 
was underway: 
 
 “Now all of a sudden, arguments 
which had almost disappeared into the 
mists  of time have come into sharp 
focus and are hotly contested across 
the world,  involving diplomatic 
relations, trade arrangements and 
stretching into the  heart of religious 
communities where people of different 
religious convictions  have to live 
side by side.” (Benn, in The Guardian, 
7.4.89) 
 
With the disappearance of the ‘enemy 
others’ of Communism and Capitalism, 
a number of commentators began to 
debate new potential enemies on a 
global scale. Particularly influential in 
this was Samuel Huntington’s so-called 
“Clash of Civilizations” thesis. The 
thesis as Huntington first published it 
appeared in an article in the journal 
Foreign Affairs under the title “The 
Clash of Civilizations?” (Huntington, 
1993). That was followed up by the 
book The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of Global Order (Huntington, 
1997) in which the question mark of the 
original title had disappeared. Thus 
what had begun as set of questions had 
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evolved into a sharper thesis, which 
was taken up by many Neocons around 
the US government of the time (see 
Bonney, 2014), in particular in terms of 
its argument throughout that “Islam has 
bloody borders” (Huntington, 1993, 35), 
and later providing a communicable 
frame for US foreign policy and military 
interventions.  
 
Over time, the groups appealing to 
Islam in their undertaking of violent 
actions have been variably called 
‘radicals’ ‘Islamists” and/or ‘Jihadists’. 
Initially emerging from US support for 
such groups in the campaign to defeat 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the 
most prominent among these was 
Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeeda which, 
following US military intervention in the 
Gulf, later went on to plan and carry out 
the spectacular 9/11 attack on the USA 
in 2001, while claiming at least 
inspirational linkages of various sorts 
with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 (7/7) 
London bombings. More recently this 
form of terror violence has become 
associated with IS (Islamic State)/ISIS 
(Islamic State in Syria)/ISL (Islamic 
State in the Levant) – also known in 
Arabic by those who oppose it, as 
Daeesh. The terror actions that Daeesh 
has conducted beyond its geographical 
heartlands in Iraq and Syria have 
ranged from bombings in Beirut, 
through the Paris shootings at the 
Charlie Hebdo magazine offices and 
the Bataclan concert venue, to the lorry 
attack on Bastille Day celebrants in 
Nice, France and the killing of a Roman 
Catholic priest and congregants in 
northern France.  
 
The direct parties involved in such 
actions are neither generally 
recognized states nor (in contrast with 
earlier African and Palestinian 
movements, groups that have achieved 
some form of recognition within the 
international system of the UNO. 
However, just as during the Cold War, 
many states are indirectly involved with 
such groups and in their conflicts in 
terms of providing financial, logistical 
and other support, either openly, 
covertly, and/or through tolerating such 
support from private sources within 
their states. Thus, within the Syrian civil 
war, some groups have been proxies 
for either Saudi Arabia or Turkey, while 
other state parties – including the 
Syrian state itself, the USA and Russia, 
have all been variously directly involved 
in asymmetrical military engagement 
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alongside or against non-state groups 
such as the Free Syrian Army, various 
Kurish groups, Daeesh and others.  
 
In the Cold War period the aims of 
militant groups generally focused on 
one or both the goals of national and/or 
socio-political change in relation to 
specific territorial boundaries. Today 
this is also the case with Boko Haram in 
Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
while at its beginning, Al-Qeeda itself 
was also more defensively and 
reactively oriented to the military 
presence in Saudi Arabia of the USA 
and its allies, with the principal aim of 
Bin Laden’s Declaration of War against 
America being to oust the USA from the 
territory of two of Islam’s most holy 
places (Wright, 2006). But there are 
also important differences with earlier 
conflicts and groups. For example, 
while ready if necessary to pay the price 
of the loss of their lives in pursuit of their 
causes, the militants of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or the 
German Bader Meinhof Group, while 
ready to deploy their individual lives to 
achieve political goals through the use 
of hunger strikes, did not generally 
undertake terror attacks on others in a 
deliberately planned way intended to 
incorporate the giving up of their own 
lives. 
 
However, just as post-9/11 there were 
those who argued that the world had 
changed and that something 
qualitatively different had emerged (see 
Lincoln, 2003), so also in relation to 
Daeesh there are many many who 
react to its barbarity by interpreting it as 
being more or less nihilistic and beyond 
the scope of diplomacy. Because of this 
it is important, as far as possible, to try 
to gain an understanding how the group 
sees itself (Saltman and Winter, 2014) 
because “nihilism” – which as a political 
concept had its origin among certain 
Russian groups of the mid-19th century 
- is not really an appropriate descriptor 
for groups that are actually far from 
being politically or morally nihilistic in 
terms of their having both a set of 
proximate temporal goals and also a 
very clearly articulated value system 
that informs their actions.  
 
Thus, when in his “Message to 
America” that accompanied Daeesh’s 
first hostage killing in the beheading of 
the American journalist James Foley, 
the so-called “Jihadi John” (Mohammed 
Emwazi) said: “You are no longer 
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fighting an insurgency. We are an 
Islamic army and a state” (quoted in 
Maher, 2015: 27), he was articulating 
that, in contrast to Al-Queeda, Daeesh 
understands itself as having a territory 
to defend and extend. Indeed, critical to 
Daeesh’s self-understanding is its 
aspiration and claim to have recreated 
the Sunni Muslim ideal of the Caliphate, 
which it believes to be the only 
environment within which Muslims can 
lead fully Islamic lives. This is why 
Daeesh is very much against Muslim 
refugees fleeing from territories that it is 
seeking to incorporate into its Caliphate 
and, by contrast, wants to encourage 
the hijrah (migration) of Muslims living 
in darul-kufr (the land of disbelief) to its 
Caliphate, understood as darul-Islam 
(the land of Islam). And it is precisely 
this invitation and opportunity to find 
personal and historic significance in 
contributing to the building of the 
Caliphate that can make Daeeh’s 
message so attractive to young 
Muslims.  
 
What is often described as ‘radicalisation’ 
has no single cause. For Muslims (and 
especially young Muslims) in Western 
societies who experience at least some 
degree of discrimination and disadvantage 
(Weller, Purdam, Ghanea, and Cheruvallil-
Contractor, 2013) and who see injustice in 
majority Muslim parts of the world, some 
reactive factors may be at work (Hussain, 
2007). There are, of course, important and 
legitimate critiques that both can and 
should be made about the status quo in the 
world. But potentially more powerful and 
seductive is the idea that it might be 
possible to make an important and historic 
contribution to the creation of a 
completely new society (Keles and Sezgin, 
2015). In combination with personal or 
immediate community experiences of 
discrimination and disadvantage, and/or 
awareness of that in relation to other co-
religionists, a “nexus of vulnerability” can 
develop within which: 
 
 “individuals who are targeted for 
recruitment by ISIS and similar groups can 
 start off by apparently discovering 
new forms of personal, social and religious 
 significance in an unjust world. But 
through the use of psychological 
 grooming, these ideals can be 
manipulated and channelled into what 
ends up  as a readiness to justify, 
support and then commit to violent 
extremism and  terror that appeals 
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to a religious justification.” (Harris, Bisset 
and Weller, 2015:  26) 
 
Daeesh’s commitment to creating a 
Caliphate might be taken as an 
indication that, contrary to what many 
think, it could in principle be possible – 
albeit with great difficulty - to conduct 
negotiations with it on a rational self-
interest basis just as it was possible to 
some extent to do with Taliban when 
they were in power in Afghanistan. 
However, it is critically important to 
understand that Daeesh also operates 
within a broader and more apocalyptic 
frame of reference in which the 
contingent and the eternal coincide not 
just in terms of a conviction about the 
absolute rightness of its cause, but also 
about its absolute significance within 
what it interprets to be an “end times” 
struggle between haqq (truth) and batil 
(falsehood) (see El-Badaway, 
Cromerford and Welby, 2015). Thus, 
when following the execution of 21 
soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army, 
Daeesh went on to execute Abdul-
Rahman (originally Peter) Kassig as its 
fifth western hostage, Jihadi John’s 
speech on that occasion took the 
opportunity to highlight that the 
execution was taking place in the north-
western Syrian town of Dabiq. 
 
 “To Obama, the dog of Rome, 
today we’re slaughtering the soldiers of 
Bashar  and tomorrow we’ll be 
slaughtering your soldiers…..We will 
break this last and  final 
crusade…..and here we are burying the 
first of your crusader army in 
 Dabiq” (quoted in Maher, 2015: 
29).  
 
As noted by Maher (2015: 29), soon 
after Russia entered the conflict, a 
Dutch fighter called Yilmaz highlighted 
the eschatological prophecies 
concerning Greater Syria/the Levant by 
stating, “Read the many hadith 
regarding Bilad al Sham and the battles 
that are going to be fought on these 
grounds”. And in the light of this Maher 
(2015: 29) argues:   
  
 “Herein lies the power of Islamic 
State’s reasoning – its fighters, and the 
 movement as a whole, draw 
huge succour from the religious 
importance of  the sites around 
which they are fighting. It serves to 
convince them of the 
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 righteousness of their cause and 
the nobility of their endeavours.” 
 
It is because Daeesh ultimately 
operates within an apocalyptic 
framework that it is currently not 
possible to deal with it in terms of 
classical state representative 
diplomacy. But neither would it be wise 
statecraft to argue to leave Daeesh 
alone in its heartlands as primarily a 
problem for the Middle East. Leaving 
aside humanitarian concern for people 
living in Daeesh’s territory who do not fit 
its particular vision of Islam, and apart 
from the dangers it poses to world 
peace in terms further igniting and 
spreading conflict in its immediate 
region, in its English language 
magazine Dabiq it articulates a global 
strategic aim to remove what it calls the 
“grey-zone”. The aim of this is, through 
terror violence committed outside its 
geographical heartlands and the 
anticipated reaction to it of the 
authorities, security services and 
peoples of the countries concerned, 
that the Muslims of the world will be 
forced to make a binary choice between 
migrating to live in the Land of Islam or 
staying to live in the Land of Disbelief. 
As the Malian-French Amedy Coulibaly 
(quoted in Maher 2015: 29) put it in a 
video explaining his participation in the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks on IS’s  behalf, 
“The time had come for another event – 
magnified by the presence of the 
Caliphate on the global stage – to 
further bring division to the world and 
destroy the grayzone everywhere”. 
Thus as Maher (2015: 29) argues, for 
Daeesh, eschatology is an “important 
motivating principle” that “underwrites 
its remarkable self-assurance and 
certainty and at the same time fuels its 
barbarism.”  
 
In some regards this echoes ‘end time’ 
narratives that one can find among 
Fundamentalist Christian circles 
inspired by the teaching and 
publications of the very widely sold 
book The Late, Great Planet Earth, by 
Hal Lindsey (1971). In this, via a 
Christian Zionism focus on Israel and its 
place in the ‘end times’, and with 
reference to imagery found in the 
biblical Book of Revelation, aspects of 
the Cold War situation of the 1970s 
were interpreted in terms of a predicted 
(and later adjusted to the 1980s and 
beyond) coming earthly and cosmic 
apocalyptic battle of “Armaggedon” 
(Lindsey, 1980). And just as Daeesh 
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have identified Dabiq in Syria as a 
location for such a ‘last battle’ by 
reference to strands of Islamic 
interpretation of the Qur’an, so those 
influenced by the work of Hal Lindsey 
and others have also anticipated that a 
final conflict will take place in the Middle 
East, albeit within their understanding, 
to take place at Megiddo in Israel. 
 
These resonances are potentially 
instructive for understanding the moral 
and epistemological orientations that 
shape current global terror actions of 
these kinds. At the same time, there is 
at least one important difference 
between those whose worldview has 
been shaped by Christian 
“dispensationalism” 7  (see Halsell, 
1999) of the kind promoted by Lindsey, 
and the vision held by followers of 
Daeesh. This is that, by and large, and 
as distinct from some earlier Christian 
millenarian groups (such as in Munster 
in the 16th century) who did seek to 
establish an earthly theocracy, by and 
large the 20th and 21st century 
Christians who have held an 
apocalyptic vision of a coming 
                                                        
7  Dispensationalism teaches that a 
number of stages of history must occur before 
the Second Coming  of Jesus. It is linked 
with the 19th century Plymouth Brother John 
Armageddon have not understood 
themselves to be under any particular 
obligation to initiate violent action 
towards it in their identity as Christians.  
 
The resonance between Christian 
dispensationalism and Daeesh style 
apocalyptic brings into focus the 
possibility that, in contrast to 
Huntington’s thesis that there is a clash 
between civilizational blocs, one might 
more accurately argue that while there 
are civilizational, cultural and religious 
spheres of interest or spheres of 
influence, within each of these there is 
a much more complex, fluid situation 
and contested situation than any more 
solidified notion of a bloc. And this is 
arguably even more the case in the 21st 
century case of conflicts involving 
religions and cultures than in was in 
relation to the blocs of the Cold War, 
given that Christian Palestinians and 
Christian Arabs are an integral part of 
Middle Eastern history and reality, and 
that there are now millions of Muslims 
in the ‘West’, not least in the European 
Union and in the USA. Therefore, as 
argued by the German political 
Darby and was popularised through  the 
so-called Schofield Bible, which contained notes 
supporting the dispensationalist hermeneutic. 
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philosopher, Dieter Sengaas (2002) in 
his book The Clash Within Civilizations: 
Coming to Terms with Cultural 
Conflicts, the main cultural and 
religious fault-lines that do exist actually 
run through, between and within geo-
political and cultural groupings rather 
than between them.  
 
If this is the case, and if it also the case 
that the religious roots and the 
eschatological orientation of Daeesh 
are critical to understanding its 
activities, then this has profound 
implications for how the current wave of 
global terror should be tackled. In the 
first instance, it is difficult for classical 
diplomacy to be conducted (and 
especially from the ‘West’) in a way that 
would not lead to the charge of 
Islamophobic (Allen, 2010) orientations 
and actions. Secondly, the classical 
forms of diplomatic argument, 
negotiation and compromise that 
appeal to self-interest are, in this 
instance, unlikely to be successful 
because there are those at least within 
Daeesh who at present see the 
Caliphate as being within compressed 
time frame leading into the coming 
future cosmic ‘end times’ battle with the 
Crusader armies. Such visions of the 
world and their implications will not be 
defeated either by calls to self-interest 
alone, since that will be viewed as a 
betrayal of ultimate convictions. Also 
brute force and naked power alone will 
not be successful, as that will only 
reinforce the self-righteousness of 
those who experience it. But if it might 
be the case that little or nothing is likely 
to be achieved by classical state 
representative diplomacy, the question 
moves into focus of what might be 
possible to progress from within Islam 
and between Muslims themselves. 
Indeed, the present author argued in a 
previous book chapter on “Conspiracy 
Theories and the Incitement of Hatred” 
that: “On a governmental and societal 
level, preventative and remedial actions 
are important in combating conspiracy 
theories and incitement to hatred. 
Statements, guidelines, codes of 
practice and initiatives in inter-faith 
dialogue are also important. However, 
in the end, it is also crucial to engage 
with these issues from within each 
particular religious and ethnic group.” 
(Weller, 2007: 194-195)  
 
It is argued again here that this is critical 
to understanding the origins and 
responses, and hence how to 
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challenge, the ideas of those who are 
attracted to the kind of vision of the 
world being projected by Daeesh and 
other groups. In other words, that where 
it may not be possible for engagement 
to take place through secular reasoning 
and the instruments of international 
law, there might be a possibility for 
engagement to be developed in 
articulation with the logic and the 
grammar of the religion concerned. And 
this is important, because there can be 
at least perceived to a tension between 
the secular registers in which human 
rights discourse international law 
operates and the values found in 
authentically religious perspectives 
(see Weller, 2006).  
 
Within this it is also important to 
understand that the public shape of 
Islam is not the shape that Christianity 
has, by and large, taken in the modern 
world. Thus, while Islam contains many 
distinct and often competing traditions, 
movements and groups, it does not 
have the equivalent of Church 
organisations. And this is closely 
related to the question of religious 
leadership in the Muslim world which is 
not, generally speaking, of the 
hierarchical or bureaucratic kinds that 
can more readily be found in 
Christianity. These two facts have a 
significant impact on expectations of 
how faith-based diplomacy can function 
when conducted from within the Muslim 
ummah or community, meaning that 
faith-based interventions based on 
Muslim religious identity are likely to be 
more informal and less official in 
character than if expected with 
reference to a Christian paradigm. Thus 
one should not expect so much in the 
way of, for example, agreed 
statements, organised initiatives, or 
authorised individuals acting on behalf 
of wider groups. Rather, the relevant 
initiatives that can offer religiously 
authentic, creative and corrective 
resources that can help contemporary 
Muslims to live in faithful, committed 
and peaceful ways in a religiously 
diverse world are likely to be much 
more informal and decentralised.  
 
One example is of the vision of Islam 
offered by the Hizmet movement, 
inspired by the teaching and example of 
the Turkish Muslim classical scholar 
and peace activist Fehullah Gülen. In 
his op-ed in Le Monde following the 
Bataclan atrocities in France, and 
entitled “Muslims, we have to critically 
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review our understanding of Islam”, 
Fethullah Gülen (2015) argued that 
“We Muslims have a special 
responsibility to ….join hands with 
fellow human beings to save our world 
from the scourge of terrorism” as well 
as “to repair the tarnished image of our 
faith”. Gülen’s vision of Islam offers 
clear challenge as to why the appeals 
of Daeesh and other similar groups to 
Islam are a distortion. It also comes out 
of an experience of dialogical 
engagement both with, and within, the 
secular modernity as it impinged upon 
Turkish society, and also engagement 
with broader “Western” society as a 
whole. But at the same time, and of 
critical import, it is informed by a deep 
and authentic Islamic tradition, practice 
and vision. As Gülen’s Le Monde piece 
said, what is called for is not “a rupture 
from the cumulative Islamic tradition”, 
but rather, “an intelligent questioning” in 
which Muslims are called to “critically 
review our understanding and practice 
of Islam, in the light of the conditions 
and requirements of our age and the 
clariifications provided by our collective 
historic experiences” and in so doing to 
be engaged in “discrediting and 
marginalising the extremist 
interpretations of religious sources.”  
 
Alternative narratives (Capan, 2004) of 
similar kinds, and the kind of actions 
necessary to implement them 
(Kalymanu, 2008) are in fact being 
created among Muslims throughout the 
world (Boase, 2005) who are also 
determined to make clear that the 
actions of violent terror perpetrated by 
some are done ‘not in our name’, 
including in those parts where Muslims 
are in a majority and societies are often 
in fundamental transition, of a very 
unstable and sometimes quite 
dangerous kind for all, including for 
Muslims themselves (Barton, Weller, 
and Yilmaz, eds. 2013).  
Reflecting such approaches are a 
series of publications produced by the 
London-based Dialogue Society and 
which are aimed at challenging the 
particular development of Islamic 
thinking and ideology that undergirds 
the attractiveness of Daeesh to 
Muslims who have a strong sense of 
the wrongness of the present world 
order. Examples of this include 
Deradicalisation by Default: The 
‘Dialogue’ Approach to Rooting out 
Violent Extremism (Dialogue Society, 
2009) that argues for the importance of 
tackling the ideology of violent 
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extremism from within an Islamic frame 
of reference; Dialogue in Islam: Qu’ran, 
Sunnah, History (Dialogue Society, 
2011) that engages with the challenge 
of some of the verses of the Qu’ran that 
are widely cited to justify violent 
extremism; while the related Centre for 
Hizmet Studies published Keles and 
Sezgin’s (2015) A Hizmet Approach to 
Rooting out Violent Extremism, which 
more explicitly and directly articulates 
an approach as informed by the 
teaching and example of Fethullah 
Gülen, 8  and translated into action by 
the so-called Hizmet (or service) 
movement inspired by his teaching and 
life. 
 
There are no easy answers here. But 
there are some actions which are both 
important and worthwhile to support 
and to try to facilitate. The difficulty with 
this is that this is not something that in 
itself is likely to facilitate dialogue with, 
or change among, those who are 
already committed to a Daeesh view of 
the world. Rather it is a ‘preventative’ 
                                                        
8  Especially following the recent 
attempted coup in Turkey it needs to be 
acknowledged that Fethullah  Gülen is a 
controversial figure whom, indeed, the current 
Turkish President and government accuse of 
 being behind the recent coup attempt. 
Having acknowledged this, however, this is not 
activity that might be capable of 
‘heading off’ the intellectual and 
emotional seductions of Daeesh and 
similar groups, and in this way to 
contribute to an attrition of Daeesh’s 
traction in the wider Muslim world. It is 
possible that this is the best that can 
realistically be hoped for in terms of any 
kind of diplomatic practice, whether 
faith-based or not, since it may not be 
without significance that the former 
Pakistani political figure Benazir Bhutto 
of Pakistan, when asked about the kind 
of violence that later played a part in her 
own death, ventured the opinion that it 
could not be defeated, but only 
contained, and that it might in time, die 
out.  
 
There are perhaps here some historical 
resonances here with the past of 
Christianity as it struggled to emerge 
from the bloody legacy of the European 
Wars of Religion and the use of the 
sword of the magistrate to try to enforce 
religious conformity (Ellerbe, 1995). So 
also, what might ultimately defeat this 
the place to go  into this in detail, except to say 
that, from the perspective of the present author, 
such claims are not  compatible with what 
is observable about the Fethullah Gülen himself, 
and the Hizmet movement  inspired by 
him, in terms of public speech and act. 
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form of Islam may be a combination of 
weariness among the faithful, 
combined with the impact and influence 
of those co-religionists whose religious 
vision is one that affirms the dignity of 
the human above and beyond all 
interpretations of the Islamic. As argued 
by Gülen in Le Monde: “We must 
categorically condemn the ideology that 
terrorists propagate and instead 
promote a pluralistic mindset with 
clarity and confidence” in which “before 
our ethnic, national or religious identity 
comes our common humanity, which 
suffers a setback each time a barbaric 
act is committed.” And if the outworking 
of the apocalyptic vision of those who 
are already committed to it can, in the 
meantime, be sufficiently contained, it 
is historically observable that if 
millennial visions of this kind do not 
come to pass within a reasonable 
timescale, they can often lose their hold 
on the faithful and/or become 
reinterpreted to take account of the 
‘end’ not having happened, thus 
potentially opening up the ground for 
more classical forms of diplomacy to 
make some future inroads. 
 
Putting all of this within a wider context, as 
argued for by the present author (Weller, 
2009: 205-206) originally in reflecting on 
the two decades on “The Other Side of 
Terror/War on Terror” following the 
inception of paradign-shifting The Satanic 
Verses controversy, “six “points of 
challenge” were identified that I would 
also argue remain relevant: 
 
1.  Governments must learn from 
history that to combat terror with methods 
that  undermine human rights will only 
strengthen those forces that use terror as 
a  means of advancing their cause. 
 
2.  To ignore or deny the reasons that 
those who use terror to advance their 
 cause give for their actions is 
unlikely to lead to a resolution of the 
problems  caused by terror. 
 
3.  Terror in the name of religion is 
particularly dangerous both to the wider 
politic  and to religions themselves, 
because it harnesses ultimate convictions 
and in  its destructive service. 
 
4.  Attempts by the ‘powers that be’ 
artificially and externally to create a 
‘liberal’  or ‘moderate’ Islam (or 
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indeed any any other religion) are likely to 
prove  ineffective and may also backfire  
 
5.  Muslims (and indeed people of 
other religions) have to accept a greater 
 responsibility for combating the 
dissemination and propagation of ‘enemy 
 images’ among their faithful. 
 
6.  For multiculturalism to continue to 
have a future, governments and societies 
 must acknowledge and tackle 
Islamophobia, and indeed all other forms 
of  hatred and discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief. 
 
The arguments of academics can be 
dismissed as setting too much store by the 
importance discourse and of narrative in a 
world that seems ultimately to be 
determined more by power and violence. 
But, as argued from a hard-nosed 
perspective one of the agencies charged 
with ensuring security and combatting 
terror actions, in its publication Words 
Make Worlds: Terrorism and Language, 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police makes 
the case that it really is the case that 
“words make worlds” in the sense that 
from a policing and security perspective 
in relation to (at the time it was written) 
Al-Quaeda type extremism - and 
therefore now by extension also to 
Daeesh: 
 
 The most effective long-term 
strategy against Al-Qai’da-type extremism, 
 whether domestic or global, may 
be rooted in the construction of 
‘alternative 
 narratives’ designed to subvert 
extremist messaging (Royal Canadian 
 Mounted Police: 2007, 3). 
 
While not providing a quick fix in terms of 
results, in the long run such internal pre-
diplomacy is likely to contribute to laying 
foundations for the most productive and 
long lasting potential for positive change.  
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